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1 Introduction
Consider a society with n agents who have to collectively choose one alternative from
a given set of social alternatives. Assume that this set is endowed with a natural strict
order because alternatives have a common characteristic according to which pairs of
alternatives can be compared in an objective way. For instance, the set of alternatives
may consist of physical locations (a public facility on a road or street), properties of
a political project in terms of its left-right characteristics, the expenditure level on a
public good, indexes reecting the quality of a product, feasible temperatures in a room,
and so on.1 In all these cases, and in many others, this linear order structure permits to
identify the set of alternatives with a subset of the real line. Agents have (potentially
di¤erent) preferences on the set of alternatives. Black (1948) is the rst to suggest that,
given the linear order on the set of alternatives, agentspreferences ought to be single-
peaked. The preference of an agent is single-peaked if there exists an alternative (called
the top) which is strictly preferred to any other alternative and on each side of the top
the preference is strictly monotonic, increasing on its left and decreasing on its right.2
Society would like to select an alternative according to agents preferences. But
since they constitute private information, agents have to be asked about them. A social
choice function on a domain of preferences requires each agent to report a preference
and associates an alternative with the reported preference prole. Hence, a social choice
function on a Cartesian product domain induces an (ordinal) direct revelation game
where each agents set of strategies is his set of possible preferences. A social choice
function is strategy-proof if no agent has ever incentives to strategically misrepresent his
preference; in other words, truth-telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy in the direct
revelation game induced by the social choice function.
Moulin (1980) characterizes the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice
functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences as the set of generalized median
voter schemes.3 A generalized median voter scheme is, in general, a non-anonymous ex-
1There is an extensive literature studying collective choice problems where the set of social alter-
natives is a linearly ordered set. See Moulin (1980), for instance. This class of problems also plays a
fundamental role in Sprumont (1995) and Barberà (2001, 2010), three excellent surveys on strategy-
proofness.
2The set of single-peaked preferences is extremely large and rich; for instance, for each alternative
there are many single-peaked preferences that have as top this alternative. Moreover, no a priori
restriction is imposed on how pairs of alternatives lying in di¤erent sides of the top are ordered. Ballester
and Haeringer (2010) identify two properties that are both necessary and su¢ cient to characterize the
domain of single-peaked preference proles.
3A social choice function is tops-only if the chosen alternative only depends on the prole of tops.
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tension of the median voter. It can be interpreted as a particular way of distributing the
power to inuence the social outcome among all coalitions of agents. In addition, Moulin
(1980) also identies the two nested subclasses of strategy-proof, tops-only and anony-
mous social choice functions, and strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and e¢ cient
social choice functions.4 The ranges of all functions in Moulin (1980)s characterizations
are closed intervals. This implies that if some alternatives were banned or infeasible,
either the social choice function would have to request from the agents more information
than just their tops, or there would be a single-peaked preference prole and an agent
with incentives to misreport his preferences.
In many applications however, the domain of preferences can be restricted even
further because the linear order structure of the set of alternatives conveys to agents
preferences more than just an ordinal content. Often, an agents preference on the set
of alternatives is responsive also to the notion of distance, embedding to the preference
its corresponding property of symmetry. A single-peaked preference is symmetric if the
following additional condition holds: an alternative is strictly preferred to another one
if and only if the former is strictly closer to the top. If an indi¤erence class contains
two alternatives then both are located in opposite sides of the top and are at the same
distance of the top.5
To restrict further the domain of a social choice function is equivalent to shrink the
set of agents strategies in its induced direct revelation game. Thus, strategies that
were dominant remain dominant while strategies that were not dominant in the larger
domain may become dominant after the domain reduction. Therefore, two important
facts hold. First, any strategy-proof social choice function on a domain remains strategy-
proof on all of its subdomains. Second, a manipulable social choice function on a domain
may become strategy-proof in a smaller subdomain.6 Hence, we ask whether the set
Tops-only social choice functions are especially simple in terms of the amount of information they
require about individual preferences. Ching (1997) gives an alternative description and several axiomatic
characterizations of generalized median voter schemes; in particular, Ching (1997) shows that in Moulin
(1980)s characterization tops-onlyness can be replaced by continuity.
4A social choice function is anonymous if it is independent of the identities of the agents; it is e¢ cient
if it always selects a Pareto optimal alternative.
5The notion of symmetric single-peakedness has already been considered in the context of strategy-
proofness; for example in Border and Jordan (1983), Peters et al. (1992), Klaus et al. (1998), Ehlers
(2002), Nisan (2007), Kar and Kibris (2008), and Klaus and Bochet (2010). It has also been considered
in the context of Political Economy to model voterspreferences over policies identied with an interval;
for example in McKelvey and Ordeshook (1993) and Krehbiel (2006).
6Observe two things. First, this is just a possibility. For instance, for the case where the set of
social alternatives is the family of all subsets of a given set of candidates Barberà et al. (1991) show
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of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked
preferences, identied by Moulin (1980) as the class of generalized median voter schemes,
becomes larger when the domain of preferences where we want the social choice functions
to operate is the subdomain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. We answer this
question a¢ rmatively by completely identifying the larger class of functions that emerge
after restricting further the domain.
The new class of social choice functions can be described as generalized median
voter schemes disturbed by discontinuity jumps. A social choice function f in the class
coincides with a generalized median voter scheme except that at some (countable number
of) discontinuity jumps (for instance, an interval (a; b) with midpoint d), instead of taking
the value prescribed by the generalized median voter scheme, f takes the constant value
a at [a; d); either the value a or b at d, and the constant value b at (d; b]. Our description
of the class makes precise that the choice of either a or b at any of those proles where
the generalized median voter scheme would choose d must be monotonic in order to
preserve strategy-proofness of the social choice function.
We want to stress the importance for applications of admitting discontinuous social
choice functions that are non-onto because they have a disconnected range, and this
range can in fact be any closed subset of alternatives. Besides, this range can be chosen
beforehand. Non-onto social choice functions are indispensable for the design of social
choice functions that require that some subsets of alternatives are never chosen due to
feasibility constraints. For instance when the range of the function has to be nite, or not
all locations for a public facility are possible, or the set of indexes reecting the quality
of a product must be disconnected, or the thermostat controlling for the temperature
in a room can not take all values, and so on. In all these cases, and in many others,
discontinuities can not be regarded as pathological features of social choice functions
but rather as indispensable requirements to deal with constraints on the set of feasible
alternatives to be chosen.7
that voting by committees is the class of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on both, the
domain of separable preferences as well as on the subdomain of additive preferences, although the set
of additive preferences is strictly smaller than the set of separable preferences. No new strategy-proof
social choice function appears after the domain reduction in this case. Second, given a tops-only social
choice function on the domain of single-peaked preferences, the set of agentsstrategies in its induced
direct revelation game is smaller when single-peaked preferences are further restricted to be symmetric
because the fact that the rule is constant (by tops-onlyness) in a large subset of proles is unrelated
with the fact that the set of preferences that agents may use to evaluate the outcomes of the social
choice function is smaller.
7Barberà et al. (1997, 2005) and Barberà et al. (1998) identify subclasses of strategy-proof social
choice functions that are able to deal with constrained sets of alternatives in di¤erent environments.
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There is a large literature studying strategy-proofness on domains related to single-
peakedness. Border and Jordan (1983) extendMoulin (1980)s results to multi-dimensional
environments. One of the domains they consider is the set of quadratic separable prefer-
ences that coincides with the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences when the
number of dimensions is equal to one. However, Border and Jordan (1983) only consider
social choice functions that respect unanimity (i.e., if all agents have the same top then
the common top should be chosen). Hence, all their results apply only to social choice
functions whose ranges coincide with the set of alternatives. In particular, they show
that for the one-dimensional case strategy-proof social choice functions that respect una-
nimity on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences are uncompromising,8 and
the partial converse that all uncompromising social choice functions are strategy-proof;
moreover, all uncompromising social choice functions on this domain are continuous.
Nehring and Puppe (2007a, 2007b) study strategy-proofness in rich domains satisfying
a general notion of single-peakedness based on abstract betweenness relations. However,
their richness condition explicitly excludes as an admitted domain the set of symmetric
single-peaked preferences since it requires that for any triple of alternatives (y; x; z) with
y not being between x and z there must exist a preference relation in the domain with
top on x such that z is strictly preferred to y. Thus, their results and ours are logically
unrelated.
Our result and its proof are closely related to the following papers. Theorem 1
partly retains the structure of Moulin (1980)s characterization of strategy-proof and
tops-only social choice functions under the single-peaked domain of preferences. Our
result in Theorem 1 says that strategy-proof social choice functions on the symmetric
single-peaked domain that are manipulable on the larger single-peaked domain consists
of generalized median voter schemes that are perturbed by specic discontinuities. Our
result is also related to Theorem 3 in Barberà and Jackson (1994) characterizing all
strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Their
characterization includes social choice functions whose range is not an interval; however,
the characterization is open because it relies on a family of tie-breaking rules (used to
select between the two extremes of the discontinuity jumps) that are not fully described.
Our characterization is closed because it explicitly describes the exact family of admissi-
ble tie-breaking rules needed to preserve strategy-proofness. Yet, we are able to provide
this closed description because our domain contains only symmetric preferences. The
8A social choice function is uncompromising if an agents top lies to the right (respectively, left) of
the chosen alternative x, then any change in the top which leaves it to the right (respectively, left) of
x will not a¤ect the choice.
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proof of our result relays at some point on Berga and Serizawa (2000)s characterization
of all strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on a minimally rich domain as the
class of generalized median voter schemes;9 we use their result in the easier case when
the given strategy-proof social choice function is continuous. In addition, our proof is
substantially simpler than it would have been if we were not able to use Barberà et
al. (2010) result identifying conditions of preference domains under which (individual)
strategy-proofness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness. Their result allows us to
avoid many steps of individual changes of preferences by instead moving simultaneously
the preferences of all members of a given coalition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present preliminary notations and
the most basic denitions. In Section 3 we state some previous results and give the main
denitions and intuitions in order to understand why and how the class of generalized me-
dian voter schemes has to be enlarged in order to identify the full class of strategy-proof
social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. In Section
4 we state and prove our main result characterizing the complete class of strategy-proof
social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences (Theorem
1). After presenting some preliminaries of the proof in Subsection 4.2, we prove Theorem
1 in Subsection 4.3. In Section 5 we rst state as corollaries of Theorem 1 the corre-
sponding characterizations under strategy-proofness and anonymity (Corollary 1) and
under strategy-proofness, anonymity and e¢ ciency (Corollary 2). We then argue about
the importance for applications of allowing for non-onto social choice functions which
were ruled out by the combination of strategy-proofness and tops-onlyness in Moulin
(1980)s characterization under single-peaked preferences and state Corollary 3 charac-
terizing all strategy-proof social choice functions that are e¢ cient relative to a given
closed set of feasible alternatives. We nish with the remark that, as the consequence of
the main result in Barberà et al. (2010), the four statements hold if we replace in them
strategy-proofness by group strategy-proofness.
9A domain is minimally rich if (i) it is a subset of the single-peaked domain, (ii) for each alternative
x there is a preference relation in the domain with top at x, and (iii) for any pair of alternatives x and
y (x 6= y) there is a preference in the domain that strictly orders x and y and whose top lies between x
and y. Obviously, the set of symmetric single-peaked preferences is a minimally rich domain.
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2 Preliminary notations and denitions
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents of a society that has to choose an alternative x
from the interval [0; 1].10 Subset of agents will be denoted by capital letters (like S) and
their cardinalities by their corresponding small letters (like s). The preference of each
agent i 2 N on the set of alternatives [0; 1] is a complete, reexive, and transitive binary
relation (a complete preorder) Ri on [0; 1]. Let R be the set of complete preorders
on [0; 1]. A preference prole R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 Rn is a n-tuple of preferences. To
emphasize the role of agent i or subset of agents T , a preference prole R will be
represented by (Ri; R i) or (RT ; R T ), respectively. As usual, let Pi and Ii denote the
strict and indi¤erence preference relations induced by Ri, respectively. Given Ri 2 R,
the top of Ri (if any) is the unique alternative t(Ri) that is strictly preferred to any
other alternative; i.e., t(Ri)Pix for all x 2 [0; 1]nft(Ri)g.
Given a subset of preferences S  R, a social choice function (SCF from now on)
f on S is a function f : Sn ! [0; 1] selecting an alternative for each preference prole
in Sn. We will refer to this Cartesian product set Sn (or to the set S itself) as the
domain of preferences. Given a SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1], denote its range by rf ; i.e.,
rf = fx 2 [0; 1] jthere exists R 2 Sn such that f(R) = xg.
We will be interested in SCFs that induce truth-telling as a (weakly) dominant
strategy in their associated (ordinal) direct revelation game.
Denition 1 A SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof if for all R 2 Sn, all i 2 N , and
all R0i 2 S,
f(Ri; R i)Rif(R0i; R i):
If f(R0i; R i)Pif(R) we say that i manipulates f at R via R
0
i. A SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1] is
group strategy-proof if for all R 2 Sn, all T  N , and all R0T 2 St with R0i 6= Ri for all
i 2 T;
f(RT ; R T )Rif(R0T ; R T )
for some i 2 T:
If f(R0T ; R T )Pif(R) for all i 2 T we say that T manipulates f at R via R0T .
We will also consider other properties of SCFs. A SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1] is anonymous
if it is invariant with respect to the agentsnames; namely, for all one-to-one mappings
 : N ! N and all R 2 Sn, f(R1; :::; Rn) = f(R(1); :::; R(n)). A SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1]
10Our results also hold for any linearly ordered metric space of alternatives. In particular, for any set
of alternatives which is a closed interval of real numbers (as well as for the set R [ f 1;+1g).
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is e¢ cient if for all R 2 Sn, there is no z 2 [0; 1] such that, for all i 2 N , zRif(R) and
zPjf(R) for some j 2 N .11 A SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1] is unanimous if for all R 2 Sn such
that t(Ri) = x for all i 2 N , f(R) = x. A SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1] is onto if for all x 2 [0; 1]
there is R 2 Sn such that f(R) = x (i.e., rf = [0; 1]). A SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1] is tops-only
if for all R;R0 2 Sn such that t(Ri) = t(R0i) for all i 2 N , f(R) = f(R0). Let S  R be
any subset of preferences with the property that for each x 2 [0; 1] there exists at least
one preference Ri 2 S such that t(Ri) = x: Then, Sn is called a rich domain and with
some abuse of notation, given a tops-only SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1] we will refer to it by its
corresponding voting scheme f : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1].
In many applications, a linear order structure on the set of alternatives naturally
induces a domain restriction in which there always exists a top, and at each of the sides
of the top the preference is strictly monotonic.
Denition 2 A preference Ri 2 R is single-peaked if:
(1) there exists the top t(Ri) of Ri, and
(2) for all x; y 2 [0; 1] such that y < x  t(Ri) or t(Ri)  x < y, xPiy.
Let SP be the set of single-peaked preferences on [0; 1]. Observe that, given a single-
peaked preference Ri 2 SP, yPix may hold even if jt(Ri)  xj < jt(Ri)  yj; but then, x
and y are necessarily located in di¤erent sides of the top t(Ri). Often, the linear order
structure of the set of alternatives and a distance conveys to the preference a symmetric
property around the top (coming for instance, from a location interpretation of the set
of alternatives) that naturally induces the restriction that preferences respond to the
distance as follows.
Denition 3 A preference Ri 2 R is symmetric single-peaked if:
(1) there exists the top t(Ri) of Ri, and
(2) for all x; y 2 [0; 1], xPiy if and only if jt(Ri)  xj < jt(Ri)  yj.
Obviously, a symmetric single-peaked preference is single-peaked. Let SSP be the
set of symmetric single-peaked preferences on [0; 1]. Given any alternative x 2 [0; 1],
there is a unique symmetric single-peaked preference Ri with its top t(Ri) = x (SSP
is a rich domain). Hence, there is a one-to-one mapping between the set of symmetric
single-peaked preferences SSP and the set of alternatives [0; 1]. Thus, we will use
ti 2 [0; 1] to identify the (unique) Ri 2 SSP such that t(Ri) = ti and t = (t1; :::; tn)
to denote the corresponding symmetric single-peaked preference prole R = (R1; :::; Rn)
11In Subsection 5.2 we will dene the notion of e¢ ciency relative to a subset of alternatives A  rf
by replacing the above condition there is no z 2 [0; 1]by there is no z 2 A.
7
such that t(Ri) = ti for all i 2 N . Note that, by this one-to-one identication, any SCF
f : SSPn ! [0; 1] is tops-only. Thus, we will also denote a SCF f : SSPn ! [0; 1]
by its corresponding voting scheme f : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1]. Following Berga and Serizawa
(2000) a subset S  SP is a minimally rich domain if it is rich and for any pair
of alternatives x; y 2 [0; 1], x 6= y, there exists Ri 2 S such that xPiy and t(Ri) 2
(minfx; yg;maxfx; yg). Observe that SSPn is a minimally rich domain.
3 Previous results and main intuition
3.1 Previous results
Moulin (1980) characterizes the family of strategy-proof and tops-only SCFs on the
domain of single-peaked preferences as well as its anonymous subfamily.12 The two
characterizations are useful to develop helpful intuitions to understand our characteriza-
tion of strategy-proof SCFs (and its anonymous subfamily) on the domain of symmetric
single-peaked preferences. To state them, we need to dene the median of an odd set of
numbers and the notion of a monotonic family of xed ballots. Given a set of odd real
numbers fx1; :::; xKg, dene its median as medfx1; :::; xKg = y, where y is such that
#f1  k  K j xk  yg  K2 and #f1  k  K j xk  yg  K2 ; observe that since K is
odd the median belongs to the set fx1; :::; xKg and it is unique. A collection fpSgS22N
is a monotonic family of xed ballots if pS 2 [0; 1] for all S 2 2N and T  Q implies
pQ  pT .
Proposition 1 (Moulin, 1980) A SCF f : SPn ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof, tops-only
and anonymous if and only if there exist n + 1 xed ballots 0  pn  :::  p0  0 such
that for all R 2 SPn,
f(R) = medft(R1); :::; t(Rn); pn; :::; p0g:
Proposition 2 (Moulin, 1980) A SCF f : SPn ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof and tops-only
if and only if there exists a monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N such that for all
R 2 SPn,
f(R) = min
S22N
max
i2S
ft(Ri); pSg:
The SCFs identied in Propositions 1 and 2 are called median voter schemes and
generalized median voter schemes, respectively. A simple way of interpreting them is as
12Moulin (1980) also characterizes the subfamily of strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and e¢ cient
SCFs on the domain of single-peaked preferences. See Corollary 2 in Section 5 for the characterization
of the same class of SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.
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follows. Each generalized median voting scheme (and its associated monotonic family
of xed ballots) can be understood as a particular way of distributing the power among
coalitions to inuence the social choice. To see that, take an arbitrary coalition S
and its xed ballot pS. Then, coalition S can make sure that, by all of its members
reporting a top alternative below pS, the social choice will be at most pS, independently
of the reported top alternatives of the members of the complementary coalition.13 An
alternative way of describing this distribution of power among coalitions is as follows. Fix
a monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N (i.e., a generalized median voter scheme)
and take a vector of tops (t(R1); :::; t(Rn)): Start at the left extreme of the interval and
push the outcome to the right until it reaches an alternative x for which the following
two things happen simultaneously: (i) there exists a coalition of agents S such that
all its members have reported a top alternative below or equal to x (i.e., t(Ri)  x
for all i 2 S) and (ii) the xed ballot pS associated to S is located also below x (i.e.,
pS  x). Median voter schemes are the anonymous subclass of generalized median voter
schemes. Hence, the xed ballots of any two coalitions with the same cardinality of
any anonymous generalized median voter scheme are equal. From a monotonic family
of xed ballots fpSgS22N associated to an anonymous generalized median voter scheme
f we can identify the n + 1 ballots pn  pn 1  :::  p0 needed to describe f as a
median voter scheme as follows: for each 0  s  n, ps = pS for all S 2 2N such that
#S = s. Moreover, if n is odd the (ordinary) median voter is obtained by choosing
pn = ::: = pn+1
2
= 0 and pn+1
2
 1 = ::: = p0 = 1 since for any R 2 SPn,
medft(R1); :::; t(Rn); pn; :::; p0g = medft(R1); :::; t(Rn); 0; :::; 0| {z }
n+1
2
 times
; 1; :::; 1| {z }
n+1
2
 times
g
= medft(R1); :::; t(Rn)g:
Finally, the SCF f where agent j 2 N is the dictator (i.e., for all R 2 SPn, f(R) =
t(Rj)) can be described as a generalized median voter scheme by setting pT = 0 for
all T  N such that j 2 T and pS = 1 for all S  N such that j =2 S: Then, for
any R 2 SPn, maxft(Rj); pfjgg = t(Rj), for any T  N such that j 2 T; t(Rj) 
maxi2Tft(Ri); pTg; and for any S  N such that j =2 S, maxi2Sft(Ri); pSg = 1: Thus,
minS022N maxi02S0ft(Ri0); pS0g = t(Rj):
Moulin (1980) also shows that the class of group strategy-proof and tops-only SCFs
on the domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with the set of generalized median
13See Barberà et al. (1997) for a similar interpretation for the case of a nite number of ordered
alternatives.
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voter schemes. From the main result in Barberà et al. (2010) we can conclude that
any strategy-proof SCF on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences is group
strategy-proof as well. Since we will later use this fact we state it here as a remark.14
Remark 1 (Barberà et al., 2010) Let f : SSPn ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF.
Then, f : SSPn ! [0; 1] is group strategy-proof.
To see that in the statements of Propositions 1 and 2 tops-onlyness does not follow
from strategy-proofness consider the SCF f : SPn ! [0; 1] where for all R 2 SPn,
f(R) =
(
0 if #fi 2 N j 0Ri1g  #fi 2 N j 1Pi0g
1 otherwise.
(1)
Notice that f is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is not tops-only. It also violates
e¢ ciency, unanimity, and ontoness. In the last section of the paper we will describe
how our characterization includes this class of SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-
peaked preferences.
3.2 Main intuition and denitions
Consider Propositions 1 and 2 for the simplest case where n = 1.15 Figure 1 depicts the
voting scheme f : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] of a strategy-proof and tops-only SCF f : SP ! [0; 1]
with the two associated xed ballots 0 < p1 < p0 < 1. Observe that for any pair of xed
ballots 0  p1  p0  1 the corresponding voting scheme f : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1] is always
increasing (i.e., 0  x < y  1 implies f(x)  f(y)), continuous, and rf = [p1; p0].
For any n  1; a voting scheme f : [0; 1]n  ! [0; 1] is increasing if f(t)  f(t0) for all
t; t0 2 [0; 1]n such that ti  t0i for all i 2 N:
14Barberà et al. (2010) give su¢ cient conditions dening domains of preferences under which strategy-
proofness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness. The domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences
satises these su¢ cient conditions.
15When n = 1 anonymity is vacuous. Indeed, we can uniquely identify the two xed ballots of the
propositions as p1 = pf1g and p0 = p;.
10
-6
t
0
p1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
p0
f(t)
p1 p0 1
1
0
Figure 1
More generally, let S be a subset of SP. A SCF f : Sn ! [0; 1] is increasing if
f(R)  f(R0) for all R;R0 2 Sn such that t(Ri)  t(R0i) for all i 2 N . By Proposition 2
the following remark holds.
Remark 2 Let f : SPn  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof and tops-only SCF. Then, its
corresponding voting scheme f : [0; 1]n  ! [0; 1] is increasing and continuous.
Lemma 1 below states that, for any n  1, any strategy-proof SCF is increasing
on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences (observe that tops-only is not
required explicitly since for each x 2 [0; 1] there exists a unique Ri 2 SSP such that
t(Ri) = x).
Lemma 1 Let f : SSPn ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF. Then, f is increasing.
Proof The statement follows from the iterated application of Claim A.
Claim A Let f : SSPn ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF. Let t; t0 2 SSPn be such
that for some i 2 N , ti < t0i and t i = t0 i. Then, f(t)  f(t0).
Proof of Claim A Assume otherwise; that is, there exist t; t0 2 SSPn and i 2 N
such that
ti < t
0
i; (2)
t i = t0 i and f(t
0) < f(t). We distinguish among six possible cases. The rst three
cases (i) f(t0) < f(t)  ti < t0i; (ii) ti  f(t0) < f(t)  t0i; and (iii) f(t0) < ti  f(t)  t0i
contradict strategy-proofness of f since in all three cases i manipulates f at t0 via ti.
The two cases (iv) ti < t0i  f(t0) < f(t) and (v) ti  f(t0)  t0i  f(t) contradict
strategy-proofness of f since in both cases i manipulates f at t via t0i. The remaining
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case is (vi) f(t0)  ti < t0i  f(t): Since ti; t0i 2 SSP and f is strategy-proof,
f(t)  ti  ti   f(t0)
t0i   f(t0)  f(t)  t0i:
Adding up,
f(t)  ti + t0i   f(t0)  ti   f(t0) + f(t)  t0i
t0i   ti  ti   t0i
t0i  ti;
a contradiction with (2). 
We have shown that the monotonicity of strategy-proof SCFs is preserved when we
restrict the domain of single-peaked preferences to be symmetric. However, continuity
(of its corresponding voting scheme) does not follow from strategy-proofness and tops-
onlyness in this smaller domain. Indeed, a special class of discontinuities may arise.
It is very easy to understand why when n = 1: First, take any  ;  2 (0; 1) such that
  minf ; 1   g and dene the SCFs f  : SSP  ! [0; 1] and f+ : SSP  ! [0; 1]
where for each ti 2 SSP,
f (ti) =
(
    if ti  
 +  if  < ti
and
f+(ti) =
(
    if ti < 
 +  if   ti:
In Figure 2 we depict f . Both f  and f+ are strategy-proof on the domain of symmetric
single-peaked preferences. At any ti 2 SSP such that either ti >  or ti <  agent i can
not manipulate them. Let ti 2 SSP be such that ti =  : Then, (   )Ii( + ) since
(   ) and ( + ) are at the same distance  to  : The function f  : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1]
is left-continuous while the function f+ : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1] is right-continuous.16 Observe
that neither f  nor f+ are strategy-proof on the domain of single-peaked preferences
since, for instance, for  = 1=2,  = 1=4, and any Ri 2 SP such that t(Ri) = 3=8 and
3=4Pi1=4 agent i manipulates f  and f+ at Ri via any R0i such that t(R
0
i) = 7=8 since
f (R0i) = f
+(R0i) = 3=4Pi1=4 = f
+(Ri) = f
 (Ri):
16A function g : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1] is left-continuous (respectively, right-continuous) if for all x 2 [0; 1]
and for any sequence fxmgm2N such that xm  x (respectively, xm  x) for all m 2 N; fxmgm2N  ! x
implies fg(xm)gm2N  ! g(x):
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t
f (t)
0
0
   
 + 
r
b
 1
1
Figure 2
More generally, a strategy-proof SCF f : SSP  ! [0; 1] could have a countable
number of discontinuities as long as the midpoint of each discontinuity jump is the
discontinuity point itself; namely, for the point d 2 [0; 1] where f is discontinuous at d,
d =
lim
x!d 
f(x) + lim
x!d+
f(x)
2
must hold, otherwise, f is not strategy-proof. Thus, discontinuity jumps have to be
symmetric around the discontinuity point.
As we will show in Section 4, the class of strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of
symmetric single-peaked preferences is the class of generalized median voter schemes
identied by Moulin (1980) plus the SCFs obtained after perturbing each generalized
median voter scheme by admitting these very particular kind of discontinuities. We will
call them disturbed minmax. Formally,
Denition 4 Let fpSgS22N be a monotonic family of xed ballots. A collection of
open intervals I = fImgm2M , where M is an indexation set, is a family of discontinuity
jumps compatible with fpSgS22N if:
(1) M is countable,
(2) for all m 2M , Im = (am; bm)  [pN ; p;],
(3) for all m;m0 2M such that m 6= m0, Im \ Im0 = ;,
(4) for all S 2 2N , pS =2
S
m2M
Im.
Given a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M we denote the midpoint of each
open interval Im = (am; bm) by dm = am+bm2 and we preliminary perturb the identity
function as follows.
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Denition 5 Given a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M , the corresponding
perturbation function I : [0; 1]! [0; 1] is dened as follows: for each x 2 [0; 1],
I(x) =
8>><>>:
x if x =2 S
m2M
Im
am if x 2 (am; dm]
bm if x 2 (dm; bm):
(3)
Let I be a family of discontinuity jumps compatible with the monotonic family of
xed ballots fpSgS22N . A possible perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme
associated to fpSgS22N that preserves its strategy-proofness in the symmetric single-
peaked domain is as follows: for each t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPn,
f(t1; :::; tn) = 
I(min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg):
We will show that these perturbed functions (of generalized median voter schemes)
are the basis to characterize the class of all strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of sym-
metric single-peaked preferences.
Figure 3 illustrates the perturbation for the case n = 1, M = fmg and I = fIm =
(am; bm)g; i.e., f(t) = I(medft; p1; p0g).
-
6
f(t)
t
0
0
p1  
 
 
ram
p1 p0
b   bm
p0
dmam bm 1
1
Figure 3
Notice that I arbitrarily assigns the value am to the point dm. If instead I(dm) =
bm, the perturbed median voter scheme would still be strategy-proof. When n = 1,
there are just two ways of perturbing the generalized median voter scheme at each
discontinuity jump while preserving its strategy-proofness. When n > 1 the process of
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assigning values to the discontinuity points in a way that maintains strategy-proofness
is more complex.
Figure 4 illustrates the perturbation of an anonymous SCF for the case n = 2,
M = fmg; I = fImg and 0 < p2 < am < dm < bm < p1 < p0 < 1; i.e., f(t1; t2) =
I(medft1; t2; p2; p1; p0g). The tops of the two agents are measured on the axes and in
bold-italic is represented the value of the SCF in each region. The bold line indicates
the discontinuity points of the SCF.
-
6
t(R1)
0
0
t(R2)
p2
p2
p2
p1
p1
p1
p1
 
 
 
t(R1)
t(R2)
t(R1)
t(R2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t(R1)
t(R2)
p0
p0
p0
am
am
am
bm
bm
bm
dm
dm 1
1
Figure 4
It is easy to see that if I had assigned the value bm; instead of am; to dm the
perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme would still have remained strategy-
proof on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. But now there are more
ways of assigning values to the discontinuity points that preserve the strategy-proofness
of f . For the particular case depicted in Figure 4, the SCF would have remained strategy-
proof and anonymous if it had assigned the value am to the points in the set B1 =
f(t1; t2) 2 [0; 1]2 j 0  t1 < dm and t2 = dmg, as well as to the points in the set
B2 = f(t1; t2) 2 [0; 1]2 j t1 = dm and 0  t2 < dmg, whereas it had assigned bm to the
point (dm; dm). Actually, if anonymity was not required then it could also have assigned
the value am to the points in B1, and bm to the rest of points in B2[f(dm; dm)g. However
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assigning the value am to the point (dm; dm) and bm to the rest of points in B1 [ B2
would violate strategy-proofness because at any prole (t1; dm) with 0 < t1 < dm agent
1 could manipulate the SCF via t01 = dm.
Intuitively, the perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme should preserve
the increasing monotonicity of the SCF; otherwise, some agent could manipulate it at
some prole. We next formalize all these possibilities.
Consider a generalized median voter scheme with its associated monotonic family of
xed ballots fpSgS22N . Let I = fImgm2M be a family of discontinuity jumps compatible
with fpSgS22N , and assume M 6= ?. Fix m 2M and dene
Dm = ft = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPn j min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg = dmg;
namely, Dm is the set of symmetric single-peaked preference proles at which the gen-
eralized median voter scheme will select dm and thus the corresponding perturbation
function I will generate a discontinuity point. We refer to any set Dm as a discontinu-
ity set. We want to determine the shape of the discontinuity sets because, in order to
maintain strategy-proofness, we must preserve the increasing monotonicity of the func-
tion. To do that we need to track the agents with tops strictly below, equal, and strictly
above dm:
Note that, since no xed ballot belongs to any discontinuity jump, if t 2 Dm then
there is at least one agent i 2 N such that ti = dm.
For each t 2 Dm dene the vector of extreme votes evm(t) = (evm1 (t); :::; evmn (t)) 2
f0; dm; 1gn; where for each i 2 N ,
evmi (t) =
8><>:
0 if 0  ti < dm
dm if ti = dm
1 if dm < ti  1:
The vector evm(t) describes at the prole t the location of the top of each agent
relative to dm (0 if it is strictly below, 1 if it is strictly above, and dm if it is exactly
located at dm). Let EV (Dm) denote the set fevm(t) j t 2 Dmg. Namely, the set EV (Dm)
describes all the extreme votes at which dm is chosen by the generalized median voter
scheme associated to the monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N . Notice that since
minS22N maxi2Sfti; pSg = dm, if we reallocate the tops below dm to 0, and the tops
above dm to 1, the minmax is not a¤ected. Therefore, minS22N maxi2Sfti; pSg = dm =
minS22N maxi2Sfevmi (t); pSg:
We now turn to describe how strategy-proof SCFs on the symmetric single-peaked
domain may choose between am and bm at those proles that induce a discontinuity at
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dm =
am+bm
2
. Dene the preorder  on Rn as follows: for all x; x0 2 Rn,
x  x0 , xi  x0i for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng
and, given m 2 M , denote the restriction of  on the set EV (Dm) by m : Observe
that the natural preorder  on Rn induces an incomplete, reexive, and transitive binary
relationm on EV (Dm) with the property that bevm m evm if and only if evm represents
a shift to the right of some of the extreme votes of bevm. Thus, m can be read as the
relation to be more rightist than.
Let Ym be a non-empty subset of EV (Dm). Denote by Xm = U(Ym) the upper
contour set of Ym (according to m) as
Xm = U(Ym) = fevm 2 EV (Dm) j bevm m evm for some bevm 2 Ymg:
By convention, set U(?) = ?. Now, given Xm  EV (Dm) with the property that
Xm = U(Xm); dene gXm : Dm  ! fam; bmg as follows: for every t 2 Dm;
gXm(t) =
(
bm if evm(t) 2 Xm
am otherwise.
The functions gXm cover all di¤erent ways of assigning values am and bm to the
preference proles that generate a discontinuity point at dm preserving the monotonicity
of the perturbation. For each particular m 2M there are many such functions because
there are many subsets Xm  EV (Dm) with the property that Xm = U(Xm). Given
a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M we say that fXmgm2M is a family of
tie-breaking sets of M if for all m 2M , Xm  EV (Dm) and Xm = U(Xm).
4 Characterization
We are now ready to dene disturbed minimax SCFs and state and prove that they
constitute the class of all strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-peaked
preferences.
4.1 Denition and statement
Denition 6 A SCF f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] is a disturbed minmax if there exist:
(1) a monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N ;
(2) a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M compatible with fpSgS22N ; and
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(3) a family of tie-breaking sets fXmgm2M of M
such that, for all t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPn;
f(t) =
8<: 
I(min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg) if min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg 6= dm for all m 2M
gXm(t1; :::; tn) if min
S22N
max
i2S
fti; pSg = dm for some m 2M:
(4)
Theorem 1 A SCF f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof if and only if it is a disturbed
minmax.
Before moving to the proof of Theorem 1 consider again the SCF f dened in (1) but
restricted to the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, where for allR 2 SSPn,
f(R) =
(
0 if #fi 2 N j 0Ri1g  #fi 2 N j 1Pi0g
1 otherwise.
Observe that for any Ri 2 SSP, 0Ri1 if and only if t(Ri)  12 : It is easy to see that
in the domain of single-peaked preferences f is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is
not tops-only. Hence, while it is excluded in Moulin (1980)s characterization under the
domain of single-peaked preferences stated above as Proposition 2, it has the following
representation as a disturbed minmax under the domain of symmetric single-peaked
preferences. Its family of monotonic xed ballots is
pS =
(
0 if #S  n
2

1 if #S <

n
2

,
where

n
2

is the smallest integer larger or equal to n
2
. The family I of discontinuity jumps
compatible with the monotonic family of xed ballots contains only one discontinuity
interval Im = (am; bm) = (0; 1) with dm = 12 ; and the tie-breaking set of M = fmg is
Xm = fev 2 f0; 12 ; 1gn j #fi 2 N j evi 2 f0; 12gg <

n
2
g.
4.2 Preliminaries of the proof of Theorem 1
We start with some additional notation. Given x 2 [0; 1], S  N with s = #S, and
t 2 SSPn, dene xS  (x; :::; x| {z }
s times
) and tS  (tj)j2S: Thus, (xS; t S)  (y1; :::; yn), where
yj = x if j 2 S and yj = tj if j =2 S: Let f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] be a SCF and S  N: Dene
the SCF Sf : [0; 1] SSPn s  ! [0; 1] as follows. For all (x; t S) 2 [0; 1] SSPn s;
Sf (x; t S) = f(x
S; t S):
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We will denote the diagonal function associated to f by f  Nf .
Given t 2 [0; 1]n and x 2 [0; 1], dene the subset of proles of tops Ct;x as:
Ct;x = ft0 2 SSPn j x  t0i  ti for all i such that x  ti and
ti  t0i  x for all i such that ti  xg;
namely, Ct;x is the set of proles t0 with the property that the top t0i of each agent i lies
between ti and x. Given a SCF f : SSPn  ! [0; 1], a subset T  SSPn, and x 2 [0; 1]
the notation f jT x means that for all t 2 T , f(t) = x:
As a consequence of Remark 1 and Lemma 1 the following statements hold.
Remark 3 Let f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF. Then,
(R3.1) f is unanimous on its range rf ; namely, x 2 rf implies f(xN) = x;
(R3.2) for all S  N , Sf : [0; 1] SSPn s  ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof; and
(R3.3) if t 2 SSPn is such that f(t) = x then, f jCt;x  x.
The two rst statements follow from group strategy-proofness (Remark 1) and the
last one from monotonicity (Lemma 1) and (R3.1).
We now state and prove the following three lemmata that will be useful in the proof
of Theorem 1. Lemma 2 says that the range of a strategy-proof SCF and the range of
its associated diagonal function coincide and it is a closed subset of [0; 1] (see also Zhou
(1991)).
Lemma 2 Let f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF. Then, rf = rf . Moreover,
rf is closed.
Proof By denition of f , rf  rf . Take x 2 rf . Then, by (R3.1), f(xN) = x.
Thus, x 2 rf . Let fxkg ! x be such that xk 2 rf for all k  1 and assume x =2 rf .
Dene y = f(xN) 6= x and let xk be such that jxk   xj < jy   xj. By (R3.1), f(xNk ) = xk.
Thus, N manipulates f at x via xk. 
Lemmata 3 and 30 roughly say that if a strategy-proof SCF is constant and equal to
x on one variable over some interval containing this constant x, but it is not constant
over the whole interval [0; 1], then there is a discontinuity at some point z and the
discontinuity leaves indi¤erent the agent with top at z (see Figures 2 and 3). In the
proof of Theorem 1, z will correspond to the midpoint dm of a discontinuity jump
Im = (am; bm), where am = x and bm = 2z   x.
Lemma 3 Let f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF with the property that there
are i 2 N , x 2 [a; b)  [0; 1], and t i 2 SSPn 1 such that
(3.1) f(ti; t i) = x for all ti 2 [a; b) and
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(3.2) f(1; t i) = y > x.
Then, there exists z 2 [b; x+y
2
] such that f(; t i) is discontinuous at z and
f j[a;z)ft ig  x
f j(z;2z x]ft ig  2z   x:
Proof Let i 2 N , x 2 [a; b), and t i 2 SSPn 1 be such that conditions (3.1) and (3.2)
hold for f . First note that the interval [b; x+y
2
] is not empty since b  x+y
2
: If b > x+y
2
then b would be closer to y than to x and for a small enough  > 0, i would manipulate
f at (b  ; t i) via t0i = 1.
Dene z = supfti 2 [0; 1] j f(ti; t i) = xg. Obviously z  b > x and, by the
monotonicity of f , limti!z  f(ti; t i) = x and f j[a;z)ft ig  x. We now prove that
limti!z+ f(ti; t i) = 2z x. Suppose that limti!z+ f(ti; t i) < 2z x. Then, there exists
 > 0 such that f(z+; t i) < 2z x 2 and f(z ; t i) = x. Either f(z+; t i)  z ,
in which case 0  f(z+ ; t i)  (z  ) < (2z x  2)  (z  ) = (z  )  f(z  ; t i),
and hence, i would manipulate f at (z   ; t i) via t0i = z + . Or f(z + ; t i) < z   ,
and therefore f(z   ; t i) = x < f(z + ; t i) < z   , and i would manipulate f at
(z  ; t i) via t0i = z+ . Similarly, if limti!z+ f(ti; t i) > 2z x, there exists  > 0 such
that f(z + ; t i) > 2z   x+ 2 and f(z   ; t i) = x. But then f(z + ; t i)  (z + ) >
(z + )  x = (z + )  f(z   ; t i) > 0 and hence, i would manipulate f at (z + ; t i)
via z   . Thus, limti!z+ f(ti; t i) = 2z   x and f(; t i) is discontinuous at z. Now by
(R3.3), f j(z;2z x]ft ig  2z   x. Finally, by monotonicity of f , 2z   x  y, and hence,
z 2 [b; x+y
2
]: 
Lemma 30 Let f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF with the property that
there are i 2 N , x 2 (a; b]  [0; 1], and t i 2 SSPn 1 such that
(3.10) f(ti; t i) = x for all ti 2 (a; b] and
(3.20) f(0; t i) = y < x.
Then, there exists z 2 [x+y
2
; a] such that f(; t i) is discontinuous at z and
f j(z;b]ft ig  x
f j[2z x;z)ft ig  2z   x.
Proof Omitted since it is symmetric to the proof of Lemma 3. 
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to check that any disturbed minmax SCF is strategy-proof on the symmetric
single-peaked domain. To see this notice that if f is a disturbed minmax SCF, for all
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t 2 SSPn;
jf(t)  min
S22N
max
j2S
ftj; pSgj = minfjx  min
S22N
max
j2S
ftj; pSgj j x 2 rfg: (5)
Fix a prole t 2 SSPn and an agent i 2 N . If ti = minS22N maxj2Sftj; pSg, then by (5) i
cannot benet from reporting a di¤erent preference. Suppose that ti < minS22N maxj2Sftj; pSg
(the case ti > minS22N maxj2Sftj; pSg is symmetric). The only way i can a¤ect the value
of the SCF is by reporting a preference t0i > minS22N maxj2Sftj; pSg. Since disturbed
minmax SCFs are increasing, f(t0i; t i)  f(t). We distinguish between two cases:
Case 1: f(t)  ti. Then jf(t0i; t i)  tij = f(t0i; t i)  ti  f(t)  ti = jf(t)  tij and the
deviation is not protable.
Case 2: f(t) < ti < minS22N maxj2Sftj; pSg. By the denition of the disturbed minmax,
it must be that f(t) = am for somem 2M and am < ti < minS22N maxj2Sftj; pSg  dm.
Hence, either f(t0i; t i) = am = f(t), in which case the deviation is not protable, or
f(t0i; t i)  bm and jf(t0i; t i)   tij = f(t0i; t i)   ti  bm   ti > bm am2  jf(t)   tij, and
again the deviation is not protable.
Thus, any disturbed minmax SCF is strategy-proof.
Let f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF. To show that f is a disturbed min-
max we rst have to identify its associated monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N ,
family I = fImgm2M of discontinuity jumps compatible with fpSgS22N , and family of tie-
breaking sets fXmgm2M of M . Then, we will show that f coincides with the disturbed
minmax SCF obtained by (4) in Denition 6, applied to all of them.
For each S 2 2N , dene its associated xed ballot by setting
pS  f(0S; 1NnS); (6)
i.e., pS is the image of f at the prole where all agents in S have their top at 0 and all
agents not in S have their top at 1.
Consider the diagonal function f : SSP  ! [0; 1] associated to f . By (R3.2)
f is strategy-proof. Thus, by Lemma 1, f is increasing and hence it has at most a
countable number of discontinuities.17 Denote by fdmgm2M the discontinuity points of
f , where M is a countable set. For each m 2 M , dene am = limx!d m f (x), and
bm = limx!d+m f (x). Since f is discontinuous at dm and increasing on [0; 1], am and
bm exist and am < bm. By Lemma 2, rf is closed and therefore am; bm 2 rf and by
17Any real-valued monotone function of a real variable has at most a countable number of disconti-
nuities. This result is due to Froda (1929) although in the literature it is widely used without Frodas
name being mentioned.
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(R3.1), f (am) = am and f (bm) = bm. Moreover, since f is strategy-proof, dm must
be the midpoint of Im  (am; bm). Otherwise, if dm < am+bm2 , there would exist an  > 0
such that dm < am+bm2    and f (am+bm2   )  bm; which would imply that f is
manipulable at am+bm
2
   via t0 = am. Similarly, if dm > am+bm2 , there would exist an
 > 0 such that dm > am+bm2 +  and f (
am+bm
2
+ )  am; which would imply that f
is manipulable at am+bm
2
+  via t0 = bm.
Notice that the family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M is compatible with
fpSgS22N since:
(1) M is countable.
(2) By the monotonicity of f , am = f (am)  f (0) = pN and bm = f (bm) 
f (1) = p; and therefore Im = (am; bm)  [pN ; p;].
(3) By the monotonicity of f and the denition of am and bm, Im \ Im0 = ; for any
m;m0 2M , m0 6= m.
(4) Finally, by (6) and Lemma 2, for each S 2 2N , pS 2 rf = rf , rf \ (am; bm) =
rf \ (am; bm) = ;. Thus, for all S 2 2N , pS =2
S
m2M
Im.
In fact,
rf = rf = [pN ; p?]nf
[
m2M
Img: (7)
If M is empty (i.e., f is continuos and its range is equal to [pN ; p?]), the statement
of Theorem 1 follows because f is a generalized median voter scheme dened on the
minimally rich domain SSPn (see Theorem 1 in Berga and Serizawa (2000)).18
Assume M is non-empty and x m 2 M . To identify the element Xm in the family
of tie-breaking sets of M , consider the previously dened discontinuity set
Dm = ft = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPn j min
S22N
max
i2S
ftig = dmg;
the set of proles of extreme votes that induce dm through the minmax
EV (Dm) = fevm(t) j t 2 Dmg;
18Observe that all results in Berga and Serizawa (2000) refer only to onto SCFs. Hence, to be more
precise with the application of their result, notice that the restriction of SSP on the interval [pN ; p?]
is a symmetric single-peaked domain (on [pN ; p?]) and it is a minimally rich domain (on [pN ; p?]).
Denote it by SSP j[pN ;p?] : Thus, we can identify the notation of Berga and Serizawa (2000) for
the image set Z = [; ] with our identied interval [pN ; p?] and apply their Theorem 1 to the SCF
f : (SSP j[pN ;p?])n  ! [pN ; p?]. Finally, observe that their generalized median voter schemes (dened
through a left-coalition system) satisfy voter sovereignty and hence, rf = [pN ; p?].
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and its associated preorder m. Then, dene
Xm = fevm 2 EV (Dm) j f(evm) > dmg: (8)
By Lemma 1, f is increasing and therefore Xm coincides with its upper contour set
relative to m; i.e., Xm = U(Xm):
So far we have identied from f the monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N ,
the family I = fImgm2M of discontinuity jumps compatible with fpSgS22N (we are now
assuming that M 6= ?), and the family fXmgm2M of tie-breaking sets of M (and hence,
its corresponding family of tie-breaking functions fgXm : Dm  ! fam; bmggm2M). Given
all of them, let F be the SCF dened by condition (4) in Denition 6. We want to show
that f = F:
Let t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPn be arbitrary. To show that f(t) = F (t) dene q =
minT22N maxi2Tfti; pTg. We distinguish among four di¤erent cases relating q, t and
f(t).
Case 1: q =2 ft1; :::; tng.
Consider S = fi 2 N j ti < qg. Then pS = q. To see that observe that
if pS < q then maxi2Sfti; pSg < q contradicting the denition of q. Further, since
q = minT22N maxi2Tfti; pTg =2 ft1; :::; tng, there exists T 2 2N , such that p T = q and
tj < p T for all j 2 T . But then, T  S and, by the monotonicity of p = fpTgT22N ,
pS  p T . Therefore, by the denition of q, pS = p T = q.
By the denition of S and the assumption that q =2 ft1; :::; tng, tj > pS for all
j =2 S. Then, t 2 C(0S ;1NnS);pS and, by (R3.3) and the denition of pS, f jC(0S;1NnS);pS  pS:
Therefore, f(t) = pS.
Moreover, by (7), pS =2 [m2MIm. Hence, by (4) in Denition 6 and the denition
of I in (3), F (t) = I(minT22N maxi2Tfti; pTg) = minT22N maxi2Tfti; pTg = pS: Thus,
f(t) = F (t).
Case 2: q = ti for some i 2 N and f(t) = ti.
If ti = f(t), then ti 2 rf and therefore, by (7), ti =2 [m2MIm. By (4) in Denition 6
and the denition of I in (3), F (t) = I(minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg) = I(ti) = ti: Thus,
f(t) = F (t):
Case 3: q = ti for some i 2 N , f(t)  x 6= ti and ti =2 [m2Mfdmg.
To show that in this case f(t) = F (t) we proceed in two steps. First we prove that
f(t) = f(tNi ) and then we prove that f(t
N
i ) = F (t).
Step 1: f(t) = f(tNi ).
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Dene S<i = fj 2 N j tj < tig; S=i = fj 2 N j tj = tig and S>i = fj 2 N j tj > tig:
We will denote Si = S
<
i [ S=i and Si = S>i [ S=i .
Because ti = minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg, it must be that ti 2 [pSi ; pS<i ]. Other-
wise, suppose rst that ti < pSi , and consider T 2 2
N . If T  Si , we have that
ti < pSi
 pT , and therefore ti < maxj2Tftj; pTg. If T \ S>i 6= ;, then by the
denition of S>i , maxj2Tftj; pTg > ti. Hence, we have a contradiction with ti =
minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg. Similarly, if pS<i < ti, then maxj2S<i ftj; pS<i g < ti again con-
tradicting ti = minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg.
We now show that f(tNi ) 2 [pSi ; pS<i ]. If f(t
N
i ) < pSi
 ti, then N manipulates f at
tNi via (0
Si ; 1S
>
i ) since f(0S

i ; 1S
>
i ) = p
Si
; and if ti  pS<i < f(tNi ), then N manipulates
f at tNi via (0
S<i ; 1S

i ) since f(0S
<
i ; 1S

i ) = pS<i :
We prove that f(t) = f(tNi ) by contradiction. Suppose f(t
N
i ) 6= f(t) = x. Then,
either x < f(tNi )  pS<i or pSi  f(t
N
i ) < x. The two cases are symmetric and therefore
we omit the proof for the second case (which uses Lemma 30 instead of Lemma 3).
Suppose x < f(tNi )  pS<i . The condition x < f(tNi ) implies x < ti since we are
assuming that x 6= ti holds and if x > ti, then N would manipulate f at tNi via t. By
(R3.3), the denition of Si and f(t) = x,

Si
f ( ; tS<i ) = x for all  2 [x; ti]:
On the other hand, since tj < ti  pS<i for all j 2 S<i , (S

i ; tS<i ) 2 C(0S<i ;1Si );p
S<
i
for all
 2 [pS<i ; 1], and therefore by (6) and (R3.3),

Si
f ( ; tS<i ) = pS<i for all  2 [pS<i ; 1]:
By Lemma 3, applied to the strategy-proof SCF S

i
f : [0; 1] [0; 1]S
<
i  ! [0; 1], where
[a; b) = [x; ti) and y = pS<i , there exists z 2 [ti;
x+p
S<
i
2
] such that S

i
f (; tS<i ) is discon-
tinuous at z and

Si
f j[x;z)ftS<
i
g  x and S

i
f j(z;2z x]ftS<
i
g  2z   x:
Applying (R3.3) again, if  2 (z; 2z   x] and t0j 2 [tj; 2z   x]19 for all j 2 S<i , then

Si
f ( ; t
0
S<i
) = 2z   x: (9)
Note that z is a discontinuity point of f as well. To see that observe that by (9),
f(wN) = 2z  x for all w 2 (z; 2z  x]. On the other hand, f(t) = x; and hence, x 2 rf
19Notice that if j 2 S<i then tj < ti  2z   x and therefore the interval is well dened.
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and by (R3.1), f(xN) = x. Assume that there exists w^ 2 (x; z) such that f(w^N) 6= x: By
monotonicity of f , x < f(w^N)  2z x. Then, either f(w^N) = 2z x andN manipulates
f at w^N via xN , or f(w^N) < 2z   x and for any 0 <  < z   w^, N manipulates f at
(z + )N via w^N : Thus, f(w^N) = x: Therefore, f has the property that
f (w) =
(
x if w 2 [x; z)
2z   x if w 2 (z; 2z   x]:
This means that f is discontinuous at z and hence there exists m 2 M such that
dm = z. Since under Case 3, ti is not a discontinuity point of f , ti 6= z and therefore,
by the denition of z, ti < z.
By monotonicity of f and (9), f(tNi )  S

i
f (z + ; t
S<i
i ) = 2z   x for all su¢ ciently
small  > 0 (in the next paragraph we will nd an upper bound for such s). We want
to show that the inequality is strict; i.e., f(tNi ) < 2z x holds. Suppose f(tNi ) = 2z x;
then, since ti < z can be re-written as ti   x < 2z   x   ti, this means that N would
manipulate f at tNi via t which contradicts strategy-proofness of f .
To sum up, we have shown that if x < f(tNi )  pS<i , then f(tNi ) < 2z   x and
lim!z+ 
Si
f ( ; t
S<i
i ) = 2z   x. But then it is easy to see that for a small  > 0, Si
manipulates f at ((z + )S

i ; t
S<i
i ) via t
Si
i . Namely, if 0 <  <
f(tNi ) x
2
, then  (2z   x 
(z + )) < f(tNi )   (z + ) < 2z   x   (z + ) where the rst inequality is equivalent
to the assumption  < f(t
N
i ) x
2
, and the second inequality follows from f(tNi ) < 2z   x.
Therefore, f(tNi )  (z + ) < 2z   x  (z + );
which means that Si manipulates f at ((z + )
Si ; t
S<i
i ) via t
Si
i ; a contradiction. This
concludes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: f(tNi ) = F (t).
By strategy-proofness of f , f is strategy-proof and since f (ti)  f(tNi ) 6= ti, by
(R3.1), ti =2 rf . By (7), there exists m 2 M such that ti 2 (am; bm). By (R3.1),
f (am) = am and f (bm) = bm. Since f is strategy-proof,
x = f (ti) =
(
am if am < ti < dm
bm if dm < ti < bm;
(10)
which coincides with the value of F (t) = I(minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg = I(ti) = x.
Thus, f(tNi )  f (ti) = F (t): This concludes the proof of Step 2.
Putting together Step 1 and Step 2, we have shown that f(t) = F (t).
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Case 4: q = ti for some i 2 N , f(t)  x 6= ti and ti = dm for some m 2M:
Denote by Im = (am; bm) the discontinuity jump corresponding to dm. Denote S=m =
fj 2 N j tj = dmg, S<m = fj 2 N j tj < dmg and S>m = fj 2 N j tj > dmg; and let  be
such that 0 <  < minj2S<m; k2S>mfdm   am; dm   tj; tk   dmg. Given this  > 0, consider
the two proles of tops t  = (tS<m ; (dm   )S
=
m ; tS>m) and t
+ = (tS<m ; (dm + )
S=m ; tS>m): By
construction of t  and t+, the fact that ti = minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg; and since pT =2 Im
for all T 2 2N , minT22N maxj2Tft j ; pTg = dm  andminT22N maxj2Tft+j ; pTg = dm+:
Both dm   and dm+  belong to Im and therefore they do not belong to rf . Moreover,
since Im \ Im0 = ;, neither dm    nor dm +  are discontinuity points of f : We are
therefore under the assumptions of Case 3, and by Step1 :
f(t ) = f (dm   ) = am
f(t+) = f (dm + ) = bm;
where the second equality in both statements follow from the strategy-proofness of f :
By monotonicity, f(t )  f(t)  f(t+); which together with (7) implies that f(t) 2
fam; bmg: Thus, we have shown that if t is such that minT22N maxj2Tftj; pTg = ti = dm
for some m 2M then,
f(t) 2 fam; bmg: (11)
To show that f(t) = F (t); assume rst that t is such that evm(t) =2 Xm: By def-
inition of F; F (t) = am: Since evm(t) =2 Xm; by (8), f(0S<m ; dS
=
m
m ; 1S
>
m)  dm which
means, by (7), that f(0S
<
m ; d
S=m
m ; 1S
>
m)  am. Moreover, t0 = (0S<m ; dS
=
m
m ; 1S
>
m) is such that
minT22N maxj2Tft0j; pTg = dm and, by (11), f(0S<m ; dS
=
m
m ; 1S
>
m) = am: By (R3.3),
f(0S
<
m ; dS
=
m
m ; tS>m) = am: (12)
If S<m = ?; then (0S
<
m ; d
S=m
m ; tS>m) = t; and f(t) = am: If S
<
m 6= ? then f(t) = am or
otherwise S<m manipulates f at t via 0
S<m. Thus, we have shown that f(t) = am = F (t):
Symmetrically, we can show that if t is such that evm(t) 2 Xm then f(t) = F (t) = bm:
This nishes the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Final remarks
As direct consequences of Theorem 1, Corollaries 1, 2 and 3 below characterize three
relevant subclasses of strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-peaked
preferences.
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5.1 Anonymity and e¢ ciency
Corollaries 1 and 2 characterize two nested subclasses: the class of strategy-proof and
anonymous SCFs (Corollary 1) and the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and e¢ cient
SCFs (Corollary 2).
To state Corollary 1 we rst need to translate the denitions of extreme votes and
tie-breaking sets of M to the anonymous case. Consider the family of n+1 xed ballots
0  pn  :::  p1  p0  1 associated to a median voter scheme and let m 2 M: The
set of proles at which the median voter scheme will select dm iseDm = ft = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPn j medft1; :::; tn; pn; :::; p0g = dmg:
By anonymity, we only need to track the number of agents with tops strictly below,
equal, and strictly above dm. Hence, for each t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPn; dene the triple
lm(t) = (lm< (t); l
m
= (t); l
m
> (t)) where:
(1) lm< (t) = #fi 2 N j ti < dmg;
(2) lm= (t) = #fi 2 N j ti = dmg; and
(3) lm> (t) = #fi 2 N j ti > dmg:
Observe that lm< (t) + l
m
= (t) + l
m
> (t) = n and since xed ballots do not belong to any
discontinuity jump, if t 2 eDm then, there is i 2 N such that ti = dm (i.e., lm= (t)  1).
Let rn = f(x; y; z) 2 f0; 1; :::; ng3 j x + y + z = n and y  1g be the set of triples with
positive integer components adding up to n and whose middle component is equal or
larger than 1 and dene L( eDm) = flm(t) 2 rn j t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 eDmg; namely, L( eDm)
describes all anonymous distributions of tops (number of tops strictly below dm, number
of tops at dm, number of tops strictly above dm) at which the median voter selects dm.
Dene the preorder e on f0; 1; :::; ng3 as follows: for all (x; y; z); (x0; y0; z0) 2 f0; 1; :::; ng3;
(x0; y0; z0)e(x; y; z), z0  z and x0  x:
Denote the restriction of the preorder e on the set L( eDm) by em and let eYm be a non-
empty subset of L( eDm). Denote by eXm = U(eYm) the upper contour set of eYm (according
to em) as the set of triples in L( eDm) such that they are more rightist than some triple
in eYm; namely,eXm = U(eYm) = f(l<; l=; l>) 2 L( eDm) j (x; y; z)em(l<; l=; l>) for some (x; y; z) 2 eYmg:
By convention, set U(?) = ?. Given eXm  L( eDm) with the property that eXm =
U( eXm); dene g eXm : eDm  ! fam; bmg as follows: for every t 2 eDm,
g
eXm(t) =
(
bm if lm(t) 2 eXm
am otherwise.
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Given a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M we say that f eXmgm2M is an anony-
mous family of tie-breaking sets of M if for allm 2M , eXm  L( eDm) and eXm = U( eXm).
Denition 7 A SCF f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] is a disturbed median if there exist:
(1) a family of n+ 1 xed ballots 0  pn  :::  p1  p0  1;
(2) a family of discontinuity jumps I = fImgm2M compatible with pn; :::; p1; p0; and
(3) an anonymous family of tie-breaking sets f eXmgm2M of M
such that, for all t = (t1; :::; tn) 2 SSPn,
f(t) =
(
I(medft1; :::; tn; pn; :::; p0g) if medft1; :::; tn; pn; :::; p0g 6= dm for all m 2M
g
eXm(t1; :::; tn) if medft1; :::; tn; pn; :::; p0g = dm for an m 2M:
Corollary 1 A SCF f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof and anonymous if and only
if it is a disturbed median.
Corollary 2 A SCF f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof, anonymous, and e¢ cient
if and only if it is a median voter scheme with the property that pn = 0 and p0 = 1.
E¢ ciency requires that f respects unanimity and hence, rf = [0; 1]. Thus, (i) its
associated family of n+1 xed ballots has the property that 0 = pn  pn 1  :::  p0 = 1
and (ii) the family of discontinuity sets M is empty. Observe that since pn = 0 and
p0 = 1 they cancel each other out in the computation of the median at any prole t
and therefore, the generalized median voter scheme can also be described as the median
of the n tops and the n   1 xed ballots pn 1  :::  p1. This corresponds to Moulin
(1980)s characterization of the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and e¢ cient SCFs
on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Thus, the reduction of the domain does not
generate in this case new strategy-proof, anonymous and e¢ cient SCFs.
5.2 Feasibility constraints
Our result has important implications for the design of strategy-proof SCFs on the do-
main of symmetric single-peaked preferences under feasibility constraints. Often, some
subsets of alternatives (although conceivable) can not be chosen due to feasibility con-
straints. Then, discontinuities are compulsory rather than pathological because discon-
tinuity jumps on the range of strategy-proof SCFs are necessary. Our result precisely
describes their nature and how the strategy-proof SCF may select its value at these
discontinuity points. However, if f is a strategy-proof and discontinuous SCF then,
rf ( [0; 1] and hence, f will not be e¢ cient; in particular, f will not respect unanimity.
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SCFs that are not e¢ cient but they are e¢ cient relative to the feasible set of alternatives
are specially interesting. Thus, let A ( [0; 1] be a closed set of feasible alternatives.20
A SCF f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] is e¢ cient relative to A if rf  A and for all R 2 SSPn
there is no z 2 A such that, for all i 2 N , zRif(R) and zPjf(R) for some j 2 N: The
following result follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3 Let A be a closed subset of [0; 1]. A SCF f : SSPn  ! [0; 1] is strategy-
proof and e¢ cient relative to A if and only if it is a disturbed minmax with rf = A:
Note that the requirement rf = A imposes certain conditions on the monotonic family
of xed ballots fpSgS22N and on the discontinuity jumps. For instance pN = minfx 2 Ag,
p? = maxfx 2 Ag and pS 2 A for all S 2 2N : Moreover since A is closed the set
[pN ; p?]nA is open and therefore it can be written as a countable and disjoint union of
open intervals: [pN ; p?]nA = [m2MIm where Im is an open interval for all m 2 M and
Im \ Im0 = ? for all m;m0 2 M . This representation is unique up to permutations in
M , and in fact the requirement rf = A implies that the family of discontinuity jumps
compatible with fpSgS22N is exactly I = fImgm2M .
As an illustration of Corollary 3, suppose that the set of feasible alternatives is A =
f0g[f0:1g[[0:2; 0:8][f0:9g. In that case the only general requirements on the xed bal-
lots are that pN = 0; p? = 0:9 and pS has to belong to A for all S 2 2N . The family of dis-
continuity jumps is given by I1 = (0; 0:1); I2 = (0:1; 0:2); and I3 = (0:8; 0:9), and there-
fore the discontinuity points are d1 = 0:05, d2 = 0:15 and d3 = 0:85. To proceed with
the illustration and in order to design a particular strategy-proof and anonymous SCF
f whose range rf be equal to A let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of agents and let p3 = p2 = 0
and p1 = p0 = 0:9 be the family of four xed ballots. In this particular case the ballots
cancel each other and hence, for all (t1; t2; t3) 2 SSP3, medft1; t2; t3; 0; 0; 0:9; 0:9g =
medft1; t2; t3g. For each discontinuity point dm the set L( eDm) consists of four triplets:
L( eDm) = f(1; 2; 0); (0; 3; 0); (1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g where for example, the triplet (1; 2; 0)
means that one top is strictly below dm and the remaining two tops are exactly equal to
dm. Note, that in all the four cases the median of the tops coincides with dm, and hence
all the proles of tops that are represented by L( eDm) result in discontinuity points. More-
over, and since L( eD1) = L( eD2) = L( eD3), e1 = e2 = e3 as well. Denote it by e0 and ob-
serve that (1; 2; 0)e0(1; 1; 1)e0(0; 2; 1), (1; 2; 0)e0(0; 3; 0)e0(0; 2; 1) and that (1; 1; 1) and
(0; 3; 0) are not comparable by e0. To assign a value to the SCF on these discontinuity
points preserving the monotonicity of the SCF f we need to select for each dm a tie-
20Remember that, by Lemma 2, strategy-proof SCFs have a closed range.
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breaking set eXm such that eXm = U( eXm):Given L( eDm), there are six di¤erent ways of do-
ing so: eXm 2 f;; f(0; 2; 1)g; f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; f(0; 3; 0); (0; 2; 1)g; f(1; 1; 1; ); (0; 3; 0); (0; 2; 1)g;
L( eDm)g: For instance, choose eX1 = f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; eX2 = f(0; 2; 1)g; and eX3 =
L( eDm). Thus, the disturbed median f that we may dene applying Denition 7 to the
family of four xed ballots 0 = p3 = p2 < p1 = p0 = 0:9, the family of discontinuity
jumps I1 = (0; 0:1); I2 = (0:1; 0:2); and I3 = (0:8; 0:9); and the anonymous family of
tie-breaking sets eX1 = f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; eX2 = f(0; 2; 1)g; and eX3 = L( eD3) has range
equal to A and it is e¢ cient relative to A: The disturbed median f could also be dened
as follows. For all t = (t1; t2; t3) 2 SSP3, and after setting y  medft1; t2; t3g;
f(t) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if y < 0:05 or y = 0:05 and #fi j ti  0:05g = 3
0:1 if y = 0:05 and #fi j ti  0:05g < 3 or 0:05 < y < 0:15
or y = 0:15 and either 9j s.t. tj < 0:15 or t1 = t2 = t3 = 0:15
0:2 if y = 0:15 and #fi j ti  0:15g = 3 and 9j s.t. tj > 0:15
or 0:15 < y < 0:2
y if 0:2  y  0:8
0:8 if 0:8 < y < 0:85
0:9 if y  0:85:
The complexity of this description indicates the usefulness of Theorem 1s characteriza-
tion.
Finally, by Remark 1, the four statements above (Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1, 2
and 3) also hold after replacing strategy-proofness by group strategy-proofness.
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